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Judicial Challenges to Mandatory Minimum Sentences:  A New Frontier in the Debate 
over Child Pornography Sentencing? 
A version of this piece was published in Sex Offender Law Report, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2012).  
Mary G. Leary 
Over the past decade, federal sentencing issues concerning child pornography have produced 
considerable legal debate, much of it focused on the application of federal sentencing guidelines 
as set forth by the United States Sentencing Commission (U.S.S.C.). Many judges have opined 
that the factors used to calculate the adjusted offense level for some child pornography offenses 
may be out of date, impracticable, and/or in conflict with 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), which requires, 
among other things, “just punishments.”  Particular concerns have been expressed that strict 
application of the sentencing guidelines can produce results in which possessors of child 
pornography (i.e. those who commit less serious child pornography offenses as compared to 
producers or distributers) may be sentenced  near the statutory maximum.  This has caused some 
judges to inquire into the rationality of guidelines which they argue place even the less culpable 
offenders at the level of punishment reserved for the most serious of offenders. E.g., U.S. v. 
Ontiveros, No. 09-CR-333, 2008 WL 2937539 (E.D. Wisc. July 24, 2008); U.S. v. Grober, 595 
F. Supp. 2d 382, 393 (D.N.J. 2008), aff’d 624 F3d. 592 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Recognizing these concerns, the Department of Justice has asked the United States Sentencing 
Commission to re-evaluate and update the current guidelines to “better calibrate the severity and 
culpability of defendants’ criminal conduct” and “ensure that the sentences for certain child 
exploitation offenses adequately reflect the seriousness of the crimes …[and] changes in the use 
of technology and in the way these crimes are regularly carried out today….” (Letter from 
Department of Justice to Sentencing Commission at 6 (June 28, 2010))  
As the Sentencing Commission works to assess and resolve some of these concerns, some 
remain dissatisfied with the sentencing options for child pornography crimes.  In response, some 
judges have attempted to wage a challenge on a new frontier: not the advisory sentencing 
guidelines, but the legislated mandatory minimum sentences.  This article will examine this 
phenomenon and explore its potential vulnerabilities through an analysis of several recent cases, 
most notably the U.S. District Court opinion in United States v. C.R., issued in May 2011 from 
the Eastern District of New York.  
Standards for Child Pornography Sentencing  
Sentencing options in federal child pornography cases are guided by at least three regimes.  The 
first, the advisory Sentencing Guidelines drafted by the Sentencing Commission, direct federal 
trial courts as to the sentencing range for a given defendant based on his offense gravity score 
and prior criminal history. These guidelines seek to assist courts in achieving accurate and 
uniform sentencing. United States v. Booker 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Courts have the discretion to 
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reject the no longer mandatory guidelines range on the basis of policy disagreement with them. 
Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (2008).   
As a second consideration, courts should sentence consistent with the factors laid out by 
Congress in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) which include, but are not limited to, the need for the sentence to 
provide a “just punishment” for the offense.  Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.   
Third, courts are bound by legislated parameters, which can include maximum penalties and 
statutory mandatory minimum sentences for some crimes.  As the name suggests, such 
boundaries are not advisory, but mandatory, on sentencing courts.  For child pornography 
offenses, there are no mandatory minimum sentences for first time offenders for possession, but 
there are for some repeat offenders as well as for other offenses including receipt, distribution, 
and production of child pornography.  E.g. 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b)(1).   
Judicial challenges to child pornography sentences have typically focused on the first of these 
three factors – the operation of the sentencing guidelines.  Most such challenges have typically 
been in the context of sentences for possession or receipt for first time offenders with no criminal 
histories.  Recently, however, at least three district courts have directed their challenges toward a 
new target: mandatory minimum sentences.  Two rulings have concerned sentences for receipt.  
United States v. Dillingham, 10-CR0002-DW (W. Dist Mo. March 17, 2011); United States v. 
Brines, 10-1094-R (May 24, 2011 C.D. Ca), appeal pending 11-50240 (9th Cir.), while one has 
refused to apply the applicable mandatory minimum in a case of distribution.  United States v. 
C.R. No. 09-CR-155, 2011 WL 1901645, *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2004). .  
United States v. Dillingham and United States v. Brines 
In Dillingham, after the defendant was convicted of receipt of child pornography, the court 
initially rejected the sentencing guideline § 2G2.2 on policy grounds and sentenced the defendant 
well below the guideline range of 210-240 months and the mandatory minimum sentence of 60 
months.  After a motion by the government to reconsider, the court recognized the distinction 
between the guidelines and the mandatory minimum sentences and resentenced the defendant to 
the statutory minimum of 60 months. In so doing, the court stated its belief that the mandatory 
minimum exceeded what was fair and just for the facts of that case and separately repeated its 
categorical rejection of § 2G2.2.      
The focus of the court’s disagreement with the minimum sentence for child pornography receipt 
was its view that no  meaningful distinction exists between possession (a charge carrying no 
mandatory minimum) and receipt (a charge carrying a five year mandatory minimum).  As with 
previous cases that had voiced concern over the mandatory minimum, Dillingham recognized 
that, while Booker declared the guidelines effectively advisory, it “[did] not expand the district 
court’s authority to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum.”  Id., citing United States 
v. Sutton, 625 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 2010).  
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Similar to Dillingham in an order without an opinion, one trial judge in the Central District of 
California has sentenced a defendant to 24 months incarceration for receipt of child pornography.  
Brines Order, May 23, 2011.  The Government has appealed said sentence.  
These two cases represent a criticism of the lack of a meaningful distinction within federal law 
between possession and receipt. Some previous opinions have criticized this as effectively 
transferring the sentencing power to the prosecution by allowing prosecutors to decide whether 
to charge receipt or possession, and thus removing the trial court’s discretion to sentence below 
the statutory mandatory minimum sentence.   
The cases which articulate these criticisms, usually possession or receipt cases, often include the 
two characteristics of an offender with no criminal history as well as the lack of any evidence 
that the offender harmed other children.  See e.g. United States v. Gellatly, No. 8:08CR50, 2009 
WL 35166 (D.Neb. Jan. 5, 2009); United States v. Szymanski, No. 3:08CR417, 2009 WL 
1212252 (N.D. Ohio April 30, 2009).  However, unlike the initial sentence in Dillingham and 
the actual Brines sentence, these previous opinions tempered their disagreement with the 
guidelines by recognizing that the statutory mandatory minimum met the requirements of 18 
U.S.C. §3553 or, at a minimum, that “the mandatory minimum does not violate the 8th 
Amendment…[and is not] cruel and unusual under the 8th Amendment simply because it is 
mandatory.”  Szymanski at *5.   
United States v. C.R.  
In May, 2011, a judge in the Eastern District of New York sentenced a defendant who plead 
guilty to distribution of child pornography, admitted to hands on sexually offending an 8-year-
old child, and had numerous bail violations, to 30 months incarceration (among other 
requirements). The sentence was below the mandatory minimum of 60 months for distribution. 
(C.R. at *1, 60).   
The trial judge, who had previously publicly stated his disagreement with the mandatory 
minimum sentences for some child pornography offenses, (E.g., U.S. v. Polouizzi, 760 F. Supp. 
2d 284, 285-286 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); U.S. v. Hernandez, No.09-CR-703,*2 2010 WL 2522417 
(E.D.N.Y. May 28, 2010); A.G. Sulzberger, Defiant Judge Takes on Child Pornography Law, 
The New York Times (May 21, 2010)) sentenced the defendant to below the mandatory minimum 
after declaring said minimum unconstitutional as applied to the defendant in this case. (C.R. at 
*1.)  Although several circuits had clearly found mandatory minimum sentences of even greater 
lengths not violative of the 8th Amendment, e.g. U.S. v. Gross, 437 F.3d 691 (7th Cir.); U.S. v. 
MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006); U.S. v. McIntosh, 414 Fed. Appx 840 (6th Cir. 2011).  
CR held that a five year mandatory minimum sentence was unconstitutional as it applied to this 
particular defendant.  The trial court attempted to overcome these clear circuit rulings by 





On September 16, 2009, the 20 year-old defendant plead guilty to distribution of child 
pornography, the first count of a five count indictment. (C.R., 09-CR-155, Doc. 24)  Counts 1-4 
pertained to different child pornography files allegedly distributed by the defendant on 
November 17, 2008, when the defendant was 19 years old. (C.R., 09-CR-155, Doc. 11.)   The 
defendant was also charged with possession of child pornography between November 17, 2008 
and January 15, 2009 and admitted to trading in child pornography for several years. (C.R., 09-
CR-155, Doc. 11) 
C.R.’s actions had been noticed by federal agents when he self-identified through his screen 
name “Boysuck0416” in a private file sharing program, Gigatribe. An agent joined the 
defendant’s buddy list and downloaded several files made available by the defendant, including 
“!!boysSUCK bf.mpg,” “Gay Pthc Dad Pops His 8yo Boys Butt Cherry – preteen pedo gay 
kiddy incest.avi,” 3boys, and !NEW! (pthc)2007 Tara 8yr-Tara kutje)(pedo)(ptsc).mpg.  The 
defendant later admitted to not only downloading and viewing child pornography but accessing 
the child pornography files of other Gigatribe members, sharing his files with others, and trading 
additional images through other peer to peer programs. C.R. at *6. 
 
Beyond the child pornography offenses, the defendant also admitted to molesting his half-sister 
beginning when the victim was 8 years old and he was 15 years old, and continuing this behavior 
with escalating severity on two other occasions most recently when the defendant was 18 years 
old and the victim was 11.  These included taking her hand, demonstrating having her stimulate 
his penis when she was 8 years old, and escalating to manually rubbing her vagina, and 
molesting her involving oral-genital contact when he was 18 years old and his victim was 11 
years old. (C.R. at 4-5; Transcript for 10/7/10 Hearing at 19-21.)  The FBI also testified that 
the defendant stated he “coached” her on how to perform oral sex on him. (C.R. Docket No. 138 
at 3-4 citing PSR ¶. 11-12; Transcript for 10/7/10 Hearing at 20.)  Additionally, the defendant 
also committed numerous violations of his conditions of release including positive drug testing,  
contacting his victim,  and hosting minors in his home where they consumed alcohol.  C.R. at 
*60-61; Docket No. 138 at 4 (citing Transcript  for 10/7/10   Hearing at 43)) 
Although the defendant pleaded guilty to distribution of child pornography, the trial court sua 
sponte stated that it did not believe the defendant committed the crime and only accepted the 
guilty plea at the “urging of defendant and his counsel.” C.R. at *1. The court’s concern centered 
around the use of peer to peer networks and suggested that perhaps the defendant did not 
knowingly distribute the child pornography because he made his child pornography available to 
others to obtain more child pornography. C.R. at *9. The court then proposed a sentence below 





United States vs. C.R. – Issues and Considerations 
In a lengthy sentencing memorandum, the trial court supported its position by invoking the 2010 
Supreme Court ruling in Graham v. Florida, and by setting forth a range of assertions regarding 
such matters as juvenile culpability, the nature of peer-to-peer file networks, and treatment 
amenability.  In interpreting Graham, the court correctly recognized that Graham clarified that 
a proportionality of punishment analysis can apply to non-capital cases, but did not apparently 
acknowledge that this expansion was limited to only categorical challenges.  C.R. at *145   
Similarly, C.R. noted that Graham accepted juvenile brain research in the context of examining 
a categorical challenge by juveniles but then sought to analogize this research to the different 
context of an individual adult (whom C.R. describes as “immature”) waging a challenge 
particular to him.  Without analysis, C.R. then maintained that Graham “opens the door” to an 
“as applied” challenge to a five year sentence for a particular adult defendant.  C.R. at *161-62. 
The Reasoning Utilized in C.R. Pulls Graham From Its Moorings. 
Graham v. Florida has the potential to do much for juveniles, including sparing them from an 
initial sentence of life in prison without a meaningful opportunity for parole.  It may as well 
mark a sea change in how juveniles are perceived by the criminal justice system. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court will address this term whether life without parole for juveniles convicted of 
homicide also violates the 8th Amendment. Miller v. Alabama, 10-9646 (2011); Jackson v. 
Hobbs, 10-9647 (2011). What more it does is a matter of debate.  Transferring its reasoning, as 
the court in C.R. attempts to do, to a particular adult’s challenge to his own five year sentence 
for distribution of child pornography seems to be a more expansive reading of Graham than 
other courts have been willing to venture.  An argument can be made that such a direction takes 
Graham on a path that seems to exceed the internal legal and factual limits of Graham. 
Legal Limits of Graham 
This term is whether Graham means that.  
Graham established that two classifications of cases addressing the proportionality of 
punishment remain: (1) cases challenging the “length of term of years sentences given all the 
circumstances in a particular case” and (2) “cases in which the Court implements the 
proportionality standard by certain categorical restrictions on the death penalty.” Graham, 130 
S. Ct. at 2021. In other words, the Court distinguishes between an individual challenging his own 
sentence and one challenging an entire category of punishments based on the nature of a 
category of crimes or the nature of a category of defendants.   
For the first category, where the particular defendant challenges his particular sentence, the 
Court gave direction.  Notably, it set forth a “narrow proportionality principle” in these term of 
years challenges, indicating that the 8th Amendment did “not require strict proportionality 
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between the crime and sentence but rather forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly 
disproportionate to the crime.’” Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2021, citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 957, 
997, 1000-1001 (1991).  The Court explicitly directed this as the approach for courts to take for 
“determining whether a sentence for a term of years is grossly disproportionate for a particular 
defendant’s crime.” Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2021.  Indeed, this approach “is suited for considering 
a gross proportionality challenge to a particular defendant’s sentence….”  Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 
2022.  Courts, therefore, still must first compare the gravity the offense with the severity of the 
sentence, and it is only the rare case that this will suggest an inference of gross 
disproportionality.  Only after this threshold is met should a court compare the defendant’s 
sentence with that received by others in the same and other jurisdictions.  If that comparison 
“validates an initial judgment that the sentence is grossly disproportionate, the sentence is cruel 
and unusual.” Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2021.  
The second category of cases uses “categorical rules to define an Eighth Amendment standard.” 
Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2021.  Graham recognized these cases have two subsets: those which 
developed a categorical rule based on the category of the nature of the offense and those that 
developed a categorical rule based on the category of the defendant.  For example, because of the 
category of the nature of the crime, such as the nature of rape of a woman (Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584 (1977)), the nature of the rape of a child (Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 
(2008)), and the nature of certain types of felony murder (Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 
(1982)), the punishing of these crimes with the severe penalty of death is now cruel and unusual.  
This applies to all defendants charged with these crimes and, as such, they are categorical rules.  
Similarly, the Court has found a categorical rule against the death penalty because of the nature 
of the defendant.  Because of the nature of being a juvenile (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551(2005)) or having a low range intelligence, (Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US 304 (2000)) these 
categories of defendants also cannot receive the death penalty, regardless of the crime. 
Throughout the C.R. opinion the court made clear that it proposed a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence as applied to the defendant, not as a 
categorical challenge. C.R. at *1, *141, *145, *150, *151, *165, *166, *167. The trial court 
acknowledged the mandatory minimum sentences for distribution of child pornography have 
been found rational and constitutional, but asserted that, because of the defendant’s age, history, 
youthful appearance, immaturity, and family history the five year mandatory minimum sentence 
was cruel and unusual. C.R. at *144-45. Therefore, the trial court’s reliance on the test reserved 
for categorical challenges and applied in Graham and Roper was misplaced.  It is true that 
Graham expanded Roper from applying only to capital cases to also applying to life without 
parole cases by eliminating the “death is different” rubric.  It did so because this challenge to life 
without parole for juveniles was a “categorical challenge to a term of year sentence” which 
thereby “implicates a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders.” 
Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2122-2123.  C.R. was not such a challenge.  C.R.’s claim was an 
individual term of years challenge which, even under Graham, applies a different test than that 
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applied in Graham.  Such a challenge still applies the gross disproportionality test  reserved for 
particular challenges. 
C.R.’s approach was novel.  Courts that have addressed individual term of years claims after 
Graham have understood that Graham continued to recognize the gross disproportionality test 
and principles for individual term of year challenges earlier outlined in Harmelin v. Michigan,  
501 U.S. 957 (1991) and reiterated in Graham.  United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1343-
1344 (2010); United States v. McIntosh, 2001 WL 924537 (6th Cir. Mar 2011); United States 
v. Marshall, 2011 WL 693254 (Feb. 28, 2011); United States v. Repogle, 395 Fed. Appx 620 
(11th Cir. Sept 9, 2010). This approach insists on judicial restraint and deference to the 
legislature. Farley, 607 F.3d at 1344.  As the 11th Circuit noted,  
The Graham decision did not undermine Harmelin insofar as adult offenders are 
concerned but recognized instead that Harmelin is still ‘suited for considering a 
gross proportionality challenge to a particular defendant’s sentence.  
Farley, 607 F. 3d at 1342, n. 34. 
Furthermore, circuits have rejected proposed extensions of Graham explicitly stating “the 
Court’s analysis in Graham was limited to defendants sentenced to life in prison without parole 
for crimes committed as juveniles.” United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1017 (2010). C.R. 
therefore, proposed a novel interpretation of Graham not echoed by its contemporaries 
Juveniles, Culpability, and Proportionality 
Beyond the issues related to the application of Graham’s standards regarding proportionality, 
C.R. also drew upon Graham to establish C.R.’s diminished culpability for this offense.  The 
court discussed at length Graham’s recitation of juvenile brain research as well as the testimony 
of one of the defense experts on the subject. However, it severed this from the context in which 
Graham invoked this research.  Graham did so because death and life without parole are 
sentences reserved for the “worst offenders,” yet the research established that juveniles, because 
of their lack of fully formed brains and character, may indeed not be the worst offenders, thus 
undermining the applicability of the most severe sentences.  Similarly, the Court recognized the 
need for hope of release in the context of juveniles and life without parole, a matter not at issue 
with significantly lesser sentences. 
The trial court cited the brain research discussion in Graham and concluded from it that “at the 
time of the crime [the defendant] was and should be characterized for sentencing as a 
developmentally immature young adult with limited ability to appreciate the legal limits on 
contacts with child pornography and to control his viewing of easily accessible internet 
programs.” C.R. at *161.   
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At its core, therefore, the trial court attempted to apply this Graham reliance on juvenile brain 
research to claim that an adult defendant facing a five-year sentence should be treated like a 
juvenile facing life without parole.  A theory that immature adults should be regarded as less 
culpable individuals, thereby precluding the application of five-year mandatory minimum 
sentences to them would mark a sea change in individual challenges to sentences under the 8th 
Amendment. This pulls Graham off its moorings.  It is taking a test for categorical challenges 
and applying it to a defendant challenging his particular term of years sentence. It is also 
severing Graham’s invocation of brain research from its Graham’s reasoning.  C.R. does not 
involve the most severe of penalties.  Rather, it involves a five-year term of year sentence, for 
which there is no such requirement it be reserved for the worst of offenders.  Indeed it is the 
minimum sentence.  
Further Concerns 
The concerning aspects of CR include not only this expansion of Graham to a particular term of 
years challenge, thus dissolving Graham’s distinction between the strict proportionality test for 
categorical challenges and the gross disproportionality test for particular challenges; or the 
expansion of the legal reasoning of Graham well beyond the category of juveniles with life 
sentences to a particular adult defendant’s sentence of 5 years’ incarceration.  There are also 
factual assertions that weaken the opinion.   
Among these is the trial court’s description of the defendant’s activity as “mere peer to peer file 
sharing” and ensuing suggestion that the defendant may not have distributed child pornography 
when he advertised and made available to download child pornography through several peer to 
peer networks.  C.R. at *1, *165.  This is curious as several circuits that have addressed the role 
of peer to peer networks in child pornography trading and rejected such a blanket absolute claim 
both with respect to 18 U.S.C. 2252A and U.S.S.C. § 2G2.2(b)(3)F).   E.g., United States v. 
Shaffer (472 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 
2009); United States v. Darway, 2007 WL 3353216 **2-3 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Carani, 492 F3d 867, 876 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Dufran, 2011 WL 2419481 *2 (11th 
Cir. 2011).  
This is  all the more curious given the defendant’s collection of several hundred child 
pornography pictures and videos, the contents of which were not limited to peers, but included 
adult molestation of prepubescent children as young as 4 and 6. (C.R. at *4, 12-15; Transcript 
from 10/7/10 Hearing at 21)  
Conclusion 
The three cases discussed here may represent a new front on the assault on child pornography 
sentences.  While they share the intended outcome of undermining the mandatory minimum 
sentences, they also vary in content.  Dillingham and likely Brines focus on the sentences for 
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receipt of child pornography and the lack of a meaningful distinction between that and 
possession.  C.R. more radically challenges a mandatory minimum sentence for a defendant who 
pled guilty to distribution of child pornography, a sentence which has specifically been excluded 
or de-emphasized by several judges’ more general criticisms of sentencing guidelines.  The 
decisions in the first two cases are flawed by confusing the sentencing guideline issues with the 
mandatory minimum sentence issues.  The C.R. decision misinterprets Graham and pulls it 
from its moorings. 
Legitimate concerns regarding the sentencing guidelines should not be lost in attacks on 
mandatory minimum sentences. As discussed, several trial courts have voiced concerns with the 
application of the sentencing guidelines, specifically § 2G2.2.  However, these cases frequently 
are characterized by two common hallmarks.  First, they are specifically focused on the 
guidelines’ effect on defendants convicted of possession or receipt with little or no other criminal 
history and no history abusing children.  E.g. Ontiveros, 2008 WL 2937539.  These courts assert 
that the enhancing factors present in § 2G2.2 are present in nearly all child pornography cases 
and “operate[]  to increase the guidelines range significantly above the mandatory minimum 
even for first offenders with no history of sexually exploiting or abusing minors, or producing, 
marketing, or selling child pornography.”  Ontiveros at *8.; see also Grober, 595 F.Supp. 2D at  
393, aff’d 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Yet these cases draw a clear distinction between concerns around the sentencing guidelines and 
existence of mandatory minimum sentences.  As noted by one court which found less deference 
to the guidelines, “[a] sentence of 60 months (5 years) will satisfy the need for the sentence to 
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide a just 
punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect the 
public from further crimes of the defendant and to provide the defendant with needed treatment.”  
Gellatly, 2009 WL 35166.  
C.R. lacks these hallmarks.  C.R. is not a solely a possessor, as he pled guilty to distribution of 
child pornography.  C.R. is not someone with no history of acting out toward children.  He 
confessed to a history of molesting his half-sister as well as sexual contact with older minors 
when he was an adult.  While the court characterizes all this  as a “sexual encounter” (C.R. at *5) 
of a confused adolescent, the record is clear that the defendant began sexually touching his half-
sister when she was 8 years old and he was fifteen, and this escalated to penetration.  While the 
cases cited in CR document much criticism of child pornography sentences, the concerns 
references are aimed primarily at guidelines problems that are not transferable to this defendant. 
Although the limits of Graham have yet to be determined, the use of it to eliminate the five year 
mandatory minimum sentence of an adult child pornography distributor who pled guilty, 
admitted to consuming and trading the material for 3-4 years, and admitted to sexually molesting 
his half-sister multiple times beginning when she was 8 years old may be more of a stretch of 
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this precedent than it can bear.  While C.R. and Dillingham raise important awareness of thorny 
issues in child pornography sentencing, applicable to guidelines, they may ask too much of 
Graham and represent an untenable extension of it both legally and factually.   
Well after Booker, sentencing concerns remain as courts seek to achieve appropriate and 
consistent sentences. In this effort, legitimate concerns exist regarding sentencing guidelines for 
the less severe child pornography offenders. These concerns, however, are not advanced by 
blurring them with attacks on congressionally mandated minimum statutory sentences for 
distribution of child pornography. Similarly, it is an open debate as to how far Graham will be 
taken.  The C.R. opinion represents one court’s application of Graham.  The utilization of 
Graham to support a challenge to a five year mandatory minimum sentence for an adult contact 
offender is likely more than Graham can bear.  It appears legally beyond what was likely 
intended by the Court and factually inconsistent with Graham. While these approaches generate 
attention, if history is any lesson, they likely will go by way of previous attempts by one of these 
same courts to circumvent the mandatory minimum sentence and be reversed.  United States v. 
Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 160-163 (2d Cir. 2009).  However, the climate surrounding the 
guidelines for child pornography offenses may affect this direction.  
